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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THELMA KOER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

1
I

vs.

f

Case No.

)
I
1
I

10630

MAYFAIR MARKETS, dba GRAND
AMERICAN MARKETS, nka ARDEN FARMS, CO.,
Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Appellant, Thelma
Koer, to recover damages for personal injuries which she
suffered as a result of slipping on the premises owned and
operated by the Respondent.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
At the close of the evidence offered by the Appellant,
the Respondent made a Motion for a Directed Verdict in
its favor and against Appellant upon the grounds that Appellant, as a matter of law, had not established any liability
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on the part of Respondent. The Court took the Motion under advisement and Respondent then presented its evidence,
after which it renewed its Motion for a Directed Verdict.
The Court did not rule on either Motion at that time, as the
Judge followed the procedure of holding the motion under
advisement and submitting special interrogatories to the
jury. The jury answered the interrogatories (R. 74), substantially in favor of Appellant, and thereafter, arguments
were made by counsel for both parties on Respondent's Motion for a Directed Verdict. The Court granted the motion
and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of Respondent
(R. 75-76).
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
While primarily the Appellant on this appeal seeks to
reverse the order of the Court in directing a verdict for the
defendant she goes further and contends that a judgment
should be entered in accordance with the findings of the
jury. She also asks for a construction of Sections 22-7-3
and 21-7-4, U. C. A. 1953. Respondent opposes the reversal
requested by the Appellant and moves to strike the other
requested reliefs for the reason that they are irrelevant and
immaterial on this Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent does not concur with the Statement of
Facts as submitted by the Appellant and therefore, sets
forth those which it considers of importance to the sole
issue herein involved. However, by way of preface, Re-
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spondent mentions that much of the information submitted
in the twenty-three pages of statements made by Appellant
under the title "Statement of Facts" include conclusions of
an argumentative nature, which are of no materiality. Inter alia these include counsel's opinion that the store manager, Harold Ross, had constructive notice of the presence
of the substance and failed to remove it; that he walked by
the spot while it lay on the floor; that it was there for him
to see; and, that he failed to observe it. Furthermore, the
statement of evidence on damages is irrelevant as that issue
has not been raised and is not before the Court.
In order to screen the evidentiary wheat from the
chaff, we state these facts as being those which cast light
on the issue to be resolved. On October 22, 1965, Appellant
entered Respondent's store located at 3400 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the purpose of purchasing
either hamburger or ground beef (R. 197). As she turned
a corner of an aisle leading into the meat section of the
store, she slipped and fell to the floor near a delicatessen
stand (R. 201). Her location at the time of the fall is
shown on Exhibit D-2 near the "Chief's Pride" display case,
and on Exhibit D-10 by a black mark (R. 187). According
to her testimony, she stepped on a slippery substance and
this caused her fall (R. 202). However, she stated that
prior to the fall the floor appeared clean and she saw no
water, paper, debris, produce, or foreign matter on the
floor (R. 240-241).
Immediately after the incident, Appellant was taken
to the office of the manager, who was then at the check-
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stand (R. 203). It was a short time thereafter that he
returned to the office to see the Appellant (R. 203). After
some discussion with her, the manager went to the area
where the place of fall was pointed out and he observed a
wet slide mark with a small substance at the end of the
marking. He concluded the foreign matter was a crushed
piece of grape (R. 169).
On the morning of the fall, the floor was cleaned by
Allred Floor Maintenance, a company specializing in that
sort of work (R. 260-263). An extensive procedure was
followed, which required four to four and one-half hours
time to complete (R. 264). After a thorough cleaning, a
slip resistant wax was used (R. 265) to cover the floor
materials and the work was completed between 8:00 and
9:00 a.m. on October 22, 1964 (R. 264).
The Respondent's manager arrived at work at 8:00
a.m. on October 22, 1964, at which time he checked the
store to see if the cleaners "had the store in good shape"
(R. 189). On that morning, he and a butcher worked in
in the aisle where Appellant fell and this was within the
area he had checked for cleanliness (R. 189). While the
manager left to perform other tasks, the butcher worked in
that aisle most of the morning (R. 190) but he was not
handling produce. Prior to the fall, employees working in
the store had not received any information from any source
that there was any produce on the floor (R. 188) nor is
there any evidence that they had observed any such condition. Before the accident, the manager had been called
from his office to the cashiers' checkstands (R. 164), which
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required him to pass between the ends of two meat counters and change direction into the aisle where the fall occurred. This aisle was twelve feet wide and after traversing it part way, the manager turned east to the checkstands (R. 165, Ex. D-2). During the walk from his office
to the checkstands, the manager did not see any foreign
object or matter on the floor (R. 165).
According to the manager at the time he was notified
of the Appellant's fall, he was standing near the fifth
checkstand (R. 164). He estimated that the time elapsing
between the time he left his office until he was advised a
lady had fallen, was two or three minutes (R. 166, 167).
After receiving the report of the fall, the manager then
looked for the Appellant and located her in the office (R.
168). Another store employee, estimated that it could have
been ten to fifteen minutes from the time she was made
aware of the incident until the manager returned to his
office (R. 155).
The area where the Appellant fell was 88 feet from
the produce area (R. 175). There were no items on display
in the immediate area of the place of the fall that remotely
resembled the substance which was found on the floor by
the store manager (R. 188). The record is silent as to
how long the object had been on the floor, how it came to
be there, or who was responsible for it being on the floor.
Its presence was undiscovered and unknown until after
the fall. There were many people at the checkstands just
before and at the time of Appellant's accident and there
had been customers shopping in the aisle where the fall
occurred immediately prior thereto (R. 184).
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ARGUMENT
Respondent does not argue Points IV and V raised byAppellant for as previously stated, in the setting of this
case, they are merely surplusage. Furthermore, Appellant's
Points I, II and III are consolidated for arguing under one
point because counsel for Respondent submit that there is
only one question raised by this appeal, namely, the propriety of the ruling of the trial court in directing a verdict
in favor of Respondent.
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIRECTING A VERDICT FOR THE RESPONDENT.
Respondent divides and argues this point in two parts,
namely, that it was not negligent for the reason (a) it had
no actual knowledge of the foreign substance on the floor,
and (b) the evidence, as a matter of law, does not present
facts from which a jury could charge Respondent with
knowledge of the presence of any slippery matter on the
floor.
We accept the proposition that Appellant brings herself within the sweep of the language in Hay ward V. Doivning, 112 Utah 508, 189 P. 2d 442, which defines the status
of a third person on the property of the owner for shopping
purposes. In that case, the Court stated:
"An 'invitee' is ordinarily one who goes upon
the premises of the owner or occupant for the pur-
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pose of transacting business or for the mutual benefit of each of them or for the benefit of the occupant, and he may expressly invited to come upon
the premises, but more commonly his invitation is
implied."
With that as a starting point, we look to the authorities to determine the duty imposed on the owner of property to protect an invitee from injury. Restatement of the
Law, Torts, Second, §343 provides:
"§343.

Dangerous Conditions known to or Discoverable by Possessor —

A possessor of land is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against the danger."
An earlier version of this rule was cited with authority in Erickson V. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 P.
2d 210 (1951), and the principles therein stated are apposite here.
In the case of Hampton v. Rowley, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350
P. 2d 151 (1960), the Court was faced with a state of facts
which established that a small rock was on a step leading
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from defendant's building. As the plaintiff was leaving
with the merchandise he had purchased, he stepped on the
rock and slipped, causing him certain personal injuries.
The error complained of on appeal was that the Court erred
in instructing the jury that the defendants could not be
held unless they either knew, or in the exercise of ordinary
care, should have known, that the rock was on the step.
A verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed and
this is the language used by the Court:
"In regard to a transitory condition of the character here involved, the instruction given is consistent with well established law that in order to
find the defendants negligent it must be shown that
they either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known, of any hazardous condition
and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the
same. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364,
284 P. 2d 477; Lucas v. City of Juneau, D. C, 168
F. Supp. 195, 198."
When the principles of the foregoing authorities are
applied to the facts in this instance, it is apparent that in
order for Appellant to establish liability, she must come
forward with evidence from which reasonable men could
reach one of two conclusions. First, that agents or employees of the Respondent had actual knowledge that there was
a foreign article on the floor which would make it unsafe
for shoppers. Second, that by exercising ordinary care,
employees of the Respondent would discover the condition.
If either of those conclusions are supported by the evidence,
then the Appellant must further show that employees of
the Respondent should expect that Appellant would not dis-
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cover the presence of the article and realize its danger.
While the Hampton case deals with an instruction to a
jury, the principle announced should be dispositive of the
case at bar for here there is no evidence from which a jury
could find that the Respondent knew or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known that an object as transitory as a grape was on the floor.
A case decided by the Supreme Court of New Mexico
has much in common with this case and we commend it to
the Court's attention. In Jimez V. Shop Rite Foods, Inc.,
72 N. M. 184, 382 P. 2d 181 (1963), plaintiff was seeking
damages for injuries resulting from a fall in defendant's
store when she slipped on a grape which was on the floor
in the produce department. The verdict was for the plaintiff and the trial court granted defendant's motion for a
judgment N. 0. V. The appellate court affirmed, stating
this interesting concept:
"We also stated that each case must be considered on its facts, and pointed out specifically that
it was not intended thereby to establish a rule requiring a storekeeper to 'follow each customer about
his store, dustpan in hand, to gather up debris.' To
conclude that in the instant case the trial court had
erred would certainly amount to a holding in effect
that this is exactly what is required."
The court, in the last cited case, determined that in
light of the facts therein stated, there was sufficient evidence of defendant's negligence and lack of due care to support a jury finding. For obvious reasons, the facts of this
case are more compelling in favor of the store owner than
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were those quoted in the cited case because this grape was
far removed from the place where produce was displayed
for sale. A grocer might anticipate produce falling on the
floor near the place of display, but not in an area far removed therefrom and where other foods are stored.
The trial judge in ruling on the motion in the case at
bar considered and analyzed the doctrine announced in
Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P. 2d 477
and Campbell v. Safetvay Stores, Incorporated, 15 Utah 2d
113, 388 P. 2d 409. He arrived at the conclusion that the
former announced the principles controlling in this case and
counsel for Respondent are convinced he decided the issues
rightly and that his holding will be supported by this Court:
This is the rationale of Lindsay:
"Plaintiff, after dining in defendant's coffee
shop, slipped in a small quantity of water which
somehow got on the floor some time after she was
seated. Although the evidence indicated that a
waitress delivered water in glasses to plaintiff and
her companion, there is no evidence as to whether
the waitress, the plaintiff, her companion, other
patrons or persons spilled the water on the floor,
or exactly when it was spilled, or whether the management knew of its existence. In other words,
there was no evidence as to how the water got onto
the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when
it arrived there or that the defendant had knowledge of its presence. Under such circumstances, a
jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the defendant was negligent. A reading of plaintiff's
authority makes obvious the factual difference between that case and its inapplicability to the one
here." (Emphasis added.)
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In the later case of Campbell, the Court distinguished
Lindsay and this was the yardstick used for differentiation:
"A more crucial question is whether the evidence will justify a finding that the defendant's
servants placed the box there. Defendant is warranted in insisting that this fact cannot be found
from speculation and conjecture, but there must be
a sound basis in the evidence from which it can
reasonably be determined that there is a greater
probability that the box was left there by an employee than otherwise. Facts shown by the evidence
which might be regarded as having a significant
bearing on that question are these: that this was
quite a small box; only six inches high, by one foot
wide and a foot and a half long; that it was of a
type which some of the canned goods come in which
the clerks remove and place on the shelves; that it
would be quite unusual for a customer to be using
a cardboard box in the merchandise area; and even
more so to be using one of this small size; that customers usually do not do so, but use shopping carts
for gathering their purchases, then go through the
checkstands; that the checkers place the items purchased in large sacks, or in some instances in boxes;
if boxes are used for this purpose, they are usually
larger than the box referred to. From these facts,
and inferences that can be drawn from them, the
jury could reasonably believe that there was a
greater probability that store employees left the
box where it was than that a customer or stranger
did. This case is distinguishable from Lindsay v.
Eccles Hotel. There the plaintiff slipped on water
spilled on the floor of a cafe. Both employees and
customers had access to the water, so it would have
involved mere conjecture as to who spilled it."
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In the case at bar, the formulae used in Lindsay fits
precisely. Here both customers and employees had access
to the grapes. There is no evidence as to whether a customer or an employee was responsible for the position of the
grape, how it got to its place of crushing, how far it might
have rolled, if it did, or that defendant had knowledge of
its presence. If we deal in probabilities — which was the
essence of the decision in Campbell — then they favor the
Respondent. The produce counter was some 88 feet away
from where the slipping occurred and there would have
been no occasion for an employee to be placing grapes on
display in that area or carrying them over a route passing
the place of fall. In addition, it is much more likely that
some customer selected a bunch of grapes, was transporting
them in the usual four wheeled basket while searching for
other merchandise and that one jarred loose and fell on the
floor. In Campbell, the Court pointed out that cartons are
used by employees of the store to transport canned goods
from a storage area to display shelves; they are left in
aisles for short periods of time; and, customers seldom cart
cartons around the store. Here the pendulum swings the
other direction for customers move produce in the baskets,
the size of the mesh permits small articles to fall through
the bottom of the carrier and there had been considerable
traffic in the aisle immediately preceeding the fall. Contrary to Campbell, in this case, it is most improbable that
the article crushed by Appellant's shoe was dropped by an
employee. In addition, the size and color of the object was
such that it would be difficult to observe and this militates
against any finding that by the exercise of reasonable care
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the Respondent would have known its position. For aught
that appears in this case, the grape could have rolled or
dropped to the position just before plaintiff arrived. Merely
because it was flattened after being crushed by Appellant's
weight does not compel a holding it was not round and
fleeting prior thereto.
Certainly Appellant's contention that the Respondent
was negligent because of the presence of the foreign substance on the floor cannot be supported by the prior decisions of this Court. Furthermore, the following cases from
other jurisdictions state cogent concepts governing slip and
fall cases and they support Respondent's assertions:
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Criner, 380 P. 2d 712 (Okla.
1963), where plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor, the
Court said at 716:
"Unless plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence
to make an issue that plaintiff slipped on floor
through negligence of defendant's employees, or because of condition of which defendant had actual
or constructive notice, in time to remove the cause
by mopping or by other means which was its duty
to reasonably do, recovery cannot be here affirmed/'
The same principle is set out in Little v. Batner, 186
Kan. 75, 348 P. 2d 1022 (1960), where plaintiff slipped on
bits of meat dropped on the floor of the store, the Court
said at 1029:
"Where the floor has been made dangerous by
the presence of an obstacle which is traceable to
persons for whom the proprietor is not responsible,
absent a condition created by himself, proof that a
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proprietor was negligent with respect to the floor
condition requires a showing that he had actual
\ notice thereof, or that the condition existed for such
a length of time that in the exercise of reasonable
care he should have known of it. ,,
A similar principle was followed in Safeway Stores,
Inc. V. Feeback, 390 P. 2d 519 (Okla. 1964) where plaintiff
slipped on carrots located on the floor. There the Court
stated that the produce had been stacked on the vegetable
counter and there was no evidence as to how the carrots
came to be on the floor or how long they had been there.
Starberg V. Olbekson, 129 P. 2d 62 (Ore. 1942) involved a situation where "green vegetable matter" was
found on the floor and the Court stated :
"The rule deducible from these authorities is
that before the proprietor of a store can be held
liable to a customer for an injury caused by slipping
on some foreign substance on the floor, the evidence
must show either that he or his agents placed it
there or that they knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence upon their part, would have known
that it was there and failed to remove it."
In Varner V. Kroeger Grocery & Baking Co., 75 S. W.
2d 585 (1934 Mo.) the Court relied on a standard of ordinary care and no negligence was found in the part of the
proprietor where plaintiff had slipped on a banana peel.
A similar result was reached in Zerbe V. Springfield, 60
N. E. 2d 793 (1943 Ohio), and there plaintiff sought to
establish the period of time the floor was unsafe by the
condition of the banana.
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The limited length of time the condition existed was
an important element in establishing no lack of due care in
the following cases: Robinson V. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 347 Mo. 421, 147 S. W. 2d 648 (1941), wherein the
Court held that "10 to 15 minutes" was not a sufficient
time to charge the proprietor with notice of a produce box
in the aisle. Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 22
Tenn. App. 7, 118 S. W. 2d 561, presented facts to the
Court which caused it to state that "20 to 30 minutes" was
not sufficient to charge the proprietor with notice of a
shopping basket in the aisle. R. E. Cox Dry Goods Co. V.
Kellog, 145 S. W. 2d 675 (Texas 1940), involved a situation
where plaintiff tripped over sample cases and the Court
concluded that because the cases constituted a hazard for
"40 minutes to an hour" was not a sufficient period on
which to base constructive knowledge.
Appellant in her brief overlooks the hypothesis that
absent some showing by competent evidence that the Respondent created the condition of danger or had knowledge
of the unsafe condition, the hazard must have existed for
such a period of time as to charge the Respondent with
notice. In that connection, it is of importance to note that
in this case there is no evidence as to the time the grape
had been on the floor. This is a fatal deficiency in proof
for if the facts support any inference in that regard, it
would be that the grape was not on the floor when the
manager proceeded from his office to the checkstand. The
trial judge so concluded. But pretermitting this conclusion,
his ruling was right because the Appellant, when given the
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benefit of all evidence and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, falls far short of showing actual knowledge of an unsafe condition of the floor or constructive notice based on the existence of a dangerous condition for a
substantial period of time.
CONCLUSION
In summation, Respondent contends that Appellant
failed to establish a prima facie case by any evidence that
Respondent was negligent in any particular. Accordingly,
she failed to raise a question of fact for jury consideration
and the trial court did not err in ruling, as a matter of law,
that the case presented no triable issue and that a verdict
in favor of Respondent must be directed.
For the foregoing reasons, it is contended that this
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE W. LATIMER,
and
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
of
PARSONS, BEHLE,
EVANS & LATIMER,
520 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent,
Mayfair Markets, dba Grand American Markets, nka Arden Farms, Co.
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